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Partnership Bankruptcy Under the
New Act
By JOHN W. HANLEY, JR.*
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 (Act), which takes effect Oc-
tober 1, 1979, represents the most comprehensive revision of federal
bankruptcy law since 1898. The product of almost a decade of govern-
mental study, the Act both modernizes the machinery of bankruptcy
administration and changes much of the substantive law of bank-
ruptcy.2 One aspect of the Act which received relatively little attention
as it moved through the legislative process was its effect on the admin-
istration of partnership bankruptcy.
3
The impact of the Act in this area is all the more significant in
light of the evolution of partnership bankruptcy, which has been
marked by a proliferation of special statutory provisions intended to
force a partnership's bankruptcy into the mold of an individual pro-
ceeding while accommodating special needs arising from the nature of
the partnership relationship.
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,4 Congress introduced the "entity
theory" of partnership to federal bankruptcy. The 1898 Act provided
for the adjudication of a partnership as an entity separate and distinct
from its members and, in section 5, set forth particular rules governing
the commencement, trusteeship, administration, and conclusion of pro-
* A.B., 1971, Stanford University, J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School; Member, State
Bars of California, Alaska.
I. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Act]. Certain
technical amendments and minor substantive changes to the Act currently are pending in
Congress. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 96-305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). Although the 1978 statutes are commonly referred to by practitioners as the "code,"
for the sake of clarity the term "Act" will be used throughout this Article.
2. For a summary of the legislative history of the Act and its terms, see Klee, The New
Bankrutc Act of 1978, 64 A.B.A.J. 1865 (1978); Spivey, Bringing Bankruptcy into Focus, 84
CASE AND COMMENT 3 (1979).
3. "Partnership bankruptcy" is used broadly in this Article to encompass both part-
nership proceedings and those aspects of individual proceedings attributable to the debtor's
status as a partner. This Article focuses largely on bankruptcy liquidation rather than reor-
ganization, although much of the discussion is relevant to either type of case.
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
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ceedings by or against a partnership. The guidance of section 5 was
less than complete, however, and a variety of procedural questions
arose, particularly concerning bankruptcy administration when a part-
nership and some of its partners were adjudicated concurrently.5 In
1938, Congress responded with the Chandler Act 6 in an effort to estab-
lish a more workable system of partnership bankruptcy by adding sev-
eral provisions to section 5.7
The reforms of the Chandler Act in turn were criticized as incom-
plete, and in 1962 legislation was proposed to rewrite in even greater
detail these particularized partnership rules. 8 This legislation was not
adopted, and today the administration of partnership bankruptcy is
governed by at least a dozen statutory subsections. 9
The 1978 Act is an historic reversal of this trend of ever increasing
detail. The Act contains only three brief provisions specifically di-
rected to partnership bankruptcy.10 This simplification of the statute is
indicative of the substantive reforms Congress has enacted to stream-
line partnership bankruptcy. Commencement of a proceeding will be
considerably easier for partnership creditors because Congress has re-
vised certain pleading and proof requirements which have proven un-
necessarily onerous. The Act also will eliminate disputes over the
dischargeability of a partnership debtor or a particular partnership debt
by denying the partnership any right to discharge at all. Perhaps most
importantly, the Act eliminates the heavily criticized and frequently re-
5. Note, Unaccomplished Reforms in Partnersho Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act,
49 YALE L.J. 908, 912 (1940) [hereinafter cited as UnaccomplishedReforms].
6. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
7. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937); S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 3 (1938).
8. H.R. 10009, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REC. 1385 (1962). The bill was pro-
posed by and introduced at the request of the National Bankruptcy Conference. See Letter
from Charles A. Horsky to Hon. Emanuel Celler and enclosed Memorandum to Accompany
Proposed Partnership Amendments (Jan. 25, 1962) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Horsky Memorandum]. The bill was the product of several years of
study and drafting by the Partnership and Drafting Committees of the Conference. See
generally Rifkind, Proposed Revision of Bankruptcy Act Relating to Partnershio Administra-
tion, 34 J. NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 72 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Revision];
Rifkind, Automatic Adjudication of Partnerships Under Section 5(i) of the Bankrupt Act, 64
COM. L.J. 321 (1959). The bill was not without its critics, even within the Conference. See
Kennedy, A New Dealfor Partnershp Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kennedy]; MacLachlan, Partnership Bankruptcy, 65 COM. L.J. 253 (1960) [here-
inafter cited as MacLachlan].
9. In addition to the eleven subsections of § 5 (codified at II U.S.C. § 23 (1976)) there
are provisions specifically addressed to partnership proceedings at 11 U.S.C. §§ 41, 107(d)
(1976).
10. 1978 Act, supra note 1, §§ 303(b), 548(b), 723.
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sisted subordination which partnership creditors suffer in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings of partners in the firm. Significantly, each of these
reforms eradicates a potential source of costly dispute and delay.
The Act, however, is not without its shortcomings. Its brevity casts
considerable doubt over the selection and powers of the trustee in both
partnership and partner proceedings. For example, the Act sheds no
light on the prerogatives of a partnership trustee to marshal both the
partnership estate and the assets of solvent and insolvent partners, cur-
rently an area of considerable uncertainty.
This Article considers the changes worked by the new Act on part-
nership bankruptcy, considering the effect on definitions, the bank-
ruptcy petition, administration of estates, exemptions, distributions,
and discharge provisions of current law. This analysis highlights the
substantial reforms which will become effective this October and con-
cludes that only thoughtful construction of the statute by the courts will
produce an efficient and equitable system of partnership bankruptcy.
Definitions
Reflecting the entity theory of partnership introduced by the Act
of 1898, current bankruptcy law treats an insolvent partnership as a
"person" entitled to the protections afforded insolvent individuals. 1
The federal statute does not define the prerequisites of a partnership,
and generally the bankruptcy court looks to the state law of the domi-
cile of a particular association to determine whether it is entitled to
proceed as a partnership. 12 In this regard, because bankruptcy courts
refuse to recognize partnership by estoppel,' 3 the point is frequently
11. Section 1(23) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1976)). References in this Article to
specific provisions of the current law are by the commonly-used Bankruptcy Act sections,
with codified section numbers indicated parenthetically.
One result of the treatment of a partnership as a separate entity is that the adjudication
of a partnership may proceed even though one of the partners is not subject to bankruptcy
because of either a disability, such as insanity or infancy, or the applicability of the statutory
exemptions for wage earners and farmers. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.08-.10
(14th ed. 1978).
12. In re 2111 Associates-Chicago, 580 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1978); Kaufman-Brown Po-
tato Co. v. Long, 182 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950); In re Segal, 157 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
However, occasionally the court will conclude that an organization which does not consti-
tute a partnership under state law has enough attributes of a partnership to justify treating it
as such in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 110 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.
1940) (Puerto Rican "Comunidad"); In re Matherly, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(joint venture); In re Bank of Crowed, 53 F.2d 682 (N.D. Tex. 1931) (banking corporation);
Burkhart v. German-American Bank, 137 F. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1904) (unincorporated banking
associations).
13. Tatum v. Acadian Prod. Corp. of Louisiana, 35 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. La. 1940); In re
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made that to proceed there must be a showing of an "actual" partner-
ship. The burden of proving the existence of and membership in an
actual partnership rests with the parties commencing the action, be they
the petitioning creditors in an involuntary proceeding 4 or the petition-
ing partnership or partner in a voluntary action.' 5
The new Act represents no change in this view of when a partner-
ship exists for purposes of bankruptcy. Partnerships are included
within the definition of "person" in the Act. 16 Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history of the Act indicates a Congressional intent to work no re-
form in this area.' 7
One provision of existing law not carried into the new Act is sec-
tion 5(a), which provides that a partnership may be adjudged a bank-
rupt "during the continuation of the partnership business or after its
dissolution and before the final settlement thereof."' 8 This authoriza-
tion was enacted in 1898 to resolve uncertainty over whether a proceed-
ing could be maintained against a partnership after it had been
dissolved under state law, either by the act or death of a general part-
ner, the conduct of a creditor, or for other reasons. While prior to the
1898 Act most courts had held that the partnership continued to exist
for purposes of bankruptcy administration,' 9 a minority disagreed
when the partnership held no assets.20 Section 5(a) expressly resolved
Ganaposki, 27 F. Supp. 41 (M.D. Pa. 1939); Note, Bankruiptcy-Partnershias-Parnerships
in Bankruptcy, 31 N.C.L. REv. 457 (1953). The cases so holding generally do so in reliance
on the principle of state law that the mere fact a purported member of a partnership holds
him- or herself out as a partner does not ordinarily give rise to a partnership liability. See,
e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16.
14. Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 6 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1925); In re Kreft, 69 F. Supp.
314 (E.D. Mo. 1946); In re Fahey, 26 F.2d 382 (S.D. Tex. 1928), a ffd sub nom. Fahey v.
Sapio, 30 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1929).
15. Utter v. Irvin, 132 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1942).
16. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 101(30).
17. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5811 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 95-989]; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6157 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-595]. However, under §§ 109(b)
and 109(d) of the Act, a partnership engaged in domestic insurance or banking may not be a
debtor, so cases such as In re Bank of Crowell, 53 F.2d 682 (N.D. Tex. 1931), and Burkhart
v. German-Am. Bank, 137 F. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1904), are overruled. See note 12 supra.
18. Section 5(a) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1976)).
19. In re Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1878) (No. 5,624); In re Noonan, 18 F. Cas.
298 (E.D. Wis. 1873) (No. 10,292); Hunt v. Pooke, 12 F. Cas. 930 (D.R.I. 1872) (No. 6,846);
In re Stowers, 23 F. Cas. 209 (D. Mass. 1871) (No. 13,516); In re Williams, 30 F. Cas. 1322
(D. Mass. 1869) (No. 17,703); In re Foster, 9 F. Cas. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 4,962); In re
Crockett, 6 F. Cas. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,402).
20. Hopkins v. Carpenter, 12 F. Cas. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 6,686); In re Hartough,
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that split by providing that proceedings could be maintained after dis-
solution.21 The new Act's elimination of this statutory directive should
not be considered an invitation to revise this point of law. The near-
universal adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act has solidified the
common law principle that a partnership continues to exist after disso-
lution with respect to past transactions, existing assets, and accrued lia-
bilities, until such time as the winding up of partnership affairs is
completed.22 In view of Congress' reliance on state law to govern the
existence and membership of partnerships in bankruptcy, there should
be no obstacle to a proceeding in bankruptcy brought by or against a
partnership already dissolved but not yet wound up.23 A rule to the
contrary would seriously cripple the utility of bankruptcy as a means of
settling the liabilities of a financially embarrassed partnership.
Petition for Order for Relief
The new law significantly simplifies both the commencement of a
debtor proceeding in bankruptcy and the terminology involved.24 Al-
though this reform was not directed specifically at the improvement of
procedures in partnership bankruptcy, it is particularly important in
that context because of the difficulties imposed by existing provisions in
the peculiar setting of a partnership proceeding.
Involuntary Petition by Partnership Creditors
Existing law specifies the circumstances under which creditors may
commence a proceeding by filing a petition against a debtor. Gener-
ally, such a petition may be filed by three or more creditors who have
11 F. Cas. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 6,164); In re Crockett, 6 F. Cas. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1868)
(No. 3,402).
21. Holmes v. Baker & Hamilton, 160 F. 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1908); In re Hirsch, 97 F.
571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).
22. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 30; Yahr-Donen Corp. v. Crocker, 80 Cal. App. 2d
675, 182 P.2d 209 (1947); Hentges v. Wolff, 240 Minn. 517, 61 N.W.2d 748 (1954).
23. Cf. In re 2111 Associates-Chicago, 580 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1978) (relying on state
law).
24. Under current law, upon the required showing by the petitioners, a debtor, whether
a partnership or any other "person" eligible for relief under the bankruptcy law, is the sub-
ject of an "adjudication" that it is a bankrupt. Sections 1(2), 18 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1(2), 41(0 (1976)). Adjudication sets in motion the machinery for administration and
liquidation and, in most cases, serves as an application for a discharge. Section 14(a) (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1976)). Under the new Act, the concept of adjudication has been
replaced by an "order for relief," 1978 Act, supra note 1, §§ 301, 303, a term deemed more
suitable and less pejorative because of the availability of voluntary bankruptcy proceedings.
S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at 31.
September 1979]
noncontingent, provable claims in excess of a specified minimum
amount. If, however, there is a total of less than twelve creditors, the
petition may be filed by any creditor or creditors having a claim in
excess of the minimum amount.25 There is no existing provision differ-
entiating partnership creditors' rights from those of other creditors in
this respect. The new Act generally retains these requirements, al-
though it raises the dollar amount prerequisite from $500 to $5,000 and
permits an involuntary reorganization proceeding under certain cir-
cumstances in which the proceedings were not available previously.26
Under current law, a petition by partnership creditors, like any
other involuntary petition, must allege that the debtor committed one
or more of six enumerated acts of bankruptcy.2 7 Ostensibly justified as
a measure of protection for debtors against oppression by creditors, this
pleading and proof requirement has been the subject of considerable
criticism.28 The requirement has proven particularly troublesome in
partnership bankruptcy because it raises subtle questions of fact sus-
ceptible of time consuming dispute. Moreover, consistent with the
treatment of a partnership as a separate entity for purposes of filing and
adjudication, the alleged act of bankruptcy must have been committed
by the partnership, with respect to partnership assets. 29 This judicial
requirement has triggered frequent dispute about whether the miscon-
duct of one partner can be attributed to the partnership. 30 These dis-
putes have been exacerbated by uncertainty in state law governing the
authority of a partner to engage in creditor-defeating conduct without
committing an act of bankruptcy. 31
25. Section 59 (codified at II U.S.C. § 95(b) (1976)).
26. See 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at 33.
27. Section 3 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976)).
28. J. MACLACHLAN, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 64 (1956); MacLachlan, supra note 8, at
254; Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy.- A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52
HARV. L. REV. 189 (1938); Note, "Acts of Bankruptcy"in Perspective, 67 HARV. L. REV. 500
(1954).
29. In re Stovall Grocery Co., 161 F. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1908); Hartman v. John Peters &
Co., 146 F. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1906).
30. This dispute is seen in several areas of partnership bankruptcy. For example, the
issue resurfaces with respect to bars to and exceptions from discharge. See text accompany-
ing notes 203-06 infra.
31. An act of bankruptcy need not be committed by all the partners to be the act of the
partnership. In re Forbes, 128 F. 137 (D. Mass. 1904). Generally, if an act of any partner is
within the scope of that partner's acting authority, and relates to partnership assets, it will
constitute an act of the partnership. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.05, at 696 (14th ed.
1978). Uncertainty in state law governing the authority of a partner to evade creditor's
claims without committing an act of bankruptcy on the part of the partnership has led some
courts to refuse to place a partnership in bankruptcy by reason of the act of one member
unless all partners either consented to or were aware of the misconduct. Donadio v. Robet-
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The 1978 Act abolishes the acts of bankruptcy. If the creditors'
petition is controverted by an alleged bankrupt partnership, an order
for relief is available upon a demonstration at trial that the debtor was
insolvent or that within 120 days prior to the filing of the petition a
custodian was appointed or was in possession of substantially all the
partnership property.32 Thus, the Act eliminates the need for review of
the past deeds of partners and the capacity in which they acted, thereby
simplifying the preliminary proceedings.
The acts of bankruptcy enumerated in current law either expressly
or impliedly embrace a concept of insolvency, and an analysis of
whether the debtor is or was insolvent almost invariably is triggered by
the act of bankruptcy allegation. 33 Current law utilizes a balance sheet
definition of insolvency: a person is deemed insolvent when the aggre-
gate of that person's property, exclusive of those assets fraudulently
concealed or conveyed, is, at fair valuation, insufficient to meet existing
debts.34
In partnership bankruptcies, the application of this concept of in-
solvency has been difficult. A principal concern has been whether part-
sky, 4 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1925) (conveyance of partnership property); In re Meyer, 98 F. 976
(2d Cir. 1899) (general assignment for benefit of creditors); In re Wellesley, 252 F. 854 (N.D.
Cal. 1917) (withdrawal and concealment of partnership funds). Contra, In re Forbes, 128 F.
137 (D. Mass. 1904). Ironically, other forms of partner conduct which could be said to
evidence a blatant disregard for the interests of the partnership creditors, such as looting of
partnership assets by the partners, cannot qualify as an act of bankruptcy because it is not an
act of the partnership. See, e.g., Davis v. Stevens, 104 F. 235 (D.S.D. 1900).
A partnership debtor is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether a partner's act of
bankruptcy constitutes an act of the partnership. Section 19 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 42
(1976)). Thus, this skirmishing can expend considerable judicial and litigant resources. See,
e.g., Carter v. Whisler, 275 F. 743 (8th Cir. 1921).
A related issue is whether a partnership act of bankruptcy can constitute the act of
bankruptcy of a nonacting partner in a proceeding against the individual. Although early
cases held in favor of such attribution, other decisions take the opposite view. Compare
Yungbluth v. Slipper, 185 F. 773 (9th Cir. 1911) and Holmes v. Baker & Hamilton, 160 F.
922 (9th Cir. 1908) with In re Jercyn Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1975) and In re
Perlhefter, 177 F. 299, 306 (S.D. N.Y. 1910). See also In re Meyer, 98 F. 976 (2d Cir. 1899).
32. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303(h).
33. Insolvency is material to all the acts of bankruptcy in one manner or another. Sec-
tion 3 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976)). An allegation of insolvency at the time of the
commission of the act of bankruptcy is essential if reliance is placed on the second (preferen-
tial transfer, § 21(a)(2)), third (suffered or permitted a lien while insolvent, § 21(a)(3)), or
fifth (appointment of a receiver or trustee, § 21(a)(5)) acts. It is ordinarily inherent in allega-
tions of the fourth (general assignment for the benefit of creditors, § 21(a)(4)) and sixth
(admission of inability to pay debts and willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt, § 21(a)(6))
acts, and solvency is a complete defense to a charge of the first act (intentional concealment
or removal of property, § 21(a)(1)).
34. Section 1(19) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976)).
September 1979) PARTNERSHIP BANKRUPTCY
ners' individual properties should be considered in determining
partnership insolvency. In the absence of a general statutory direc-
tive,35 the rule has evolved that a court must consider not only partner-
ship assets and liabilities but also the assets of each individual partner,
if any, in excess of personal liabilities. 36 The premise of this approach
is that the partners' obligations to contribute capital sufficient to enable
the partnership to discharge its own liabilities should be considered a
partnership "asset." In the words of the United States Supreme Court,
"ordinarily it would be impossible that a firm should be insolvent while
the members of it remain able to pay its debts with money available for
that end." 37 Given this ultimate liability of partners, the only realistic
and practical alternative is to evaluate their solvencies before determin-
ing whether to engage the machinery of bankruptcy administration.38
Criticism of this rule has been raised on both theoretical and prag-
matic grounds. In the years immediately following the Act of 1898, a
minority of courts condemned the approach as conceptually incompat-
ible with the separate entity principles which the new law embraced. 39
This objection soon gave way to more practical criticisms that such an
approach was both an undue burden and a trap for the unwary. First,
while a petitioner clearly must prove the insolvency of the partners to
establish a partnership insolvency, whether such insolvency must be
pleaded was, and is, uncertain. Some courts view such a pleading as
desirable but not necessary;40 at least one decision considers such a
pleading a jurisdictional prerequisite.4' A second criticism was that the
administrative burden of identifying and evaluating the assets and lia-
bilities of every partner in a firm can be substantial and even insur-
mountable, particularly when the assets of uncooperative partners are
35. A statutory definition of partnership insolvency only for purposes of invalidating
fraudulent conveyances is provided in § 67(d)(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(l) (1976)).
It utilizes the majority rule described in the text.
36. Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F.2d 594, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1950); Mason
v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943); In re Segal, 157 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
37. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695, 700 (1913) (dicta).
38. See, e.g., Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943); Kennedy, supra note 8, at
613-14.
39. In re Bertenshaw, 157 F. 363 (8th Cir. 1907); In re McMurtrey & Smith, 142 F. 853
(W.D. Tex. 1905). See also Brannon, The Separate Estates of Non-Bankrupt Partners in the
Bankruptcy of a Partnership Under the National Bankruptcy Act, 20 HARv. L. REV. 589
(1907); Hough, Some New Aspects of Partnershi Bankruptcy Under the Act of 1898, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 599 (1908); Note, The Entity Theory of Partnership Under the National
Bankruptcy Act, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 145 (1913).
40. See, e.g., Viburnum One Assoc. v. Flavin Enterprises, 446 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Mo.
1978).
41. In re Ross Sand & Gravel, Inc., 289 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1961).
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located outside of this country.42 Finally, critics argued, the rule that a
partner's exempt assets be considered in the aggregate analysis of part-
nership insolvency is illogical because the bankruptcy court could not
compel the contribution of such assets to the partnership trustee.43
Persuaded by such criticisms, the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence in 1961 condemned this rule of partnership insolvency as an
"onerous burden. . . on partnership creditors, or one of the partners,
seeking an adjudication. . ... ,44 The Conference proposed an amend-
ment to the law specifying that partnership insolvency should be deter-
mined solely by reference to partnership assets and liabilities. This
proposal in turn drew criticism that such an amendment would precipi-
tate premature and unnecessary proceedings against partnerships
whose partners had sufficient creditworthiness or which otherwise
should not be subject to administration.45 Ultimately, the proposal was
shelved. Thus, the required showing of partnership insolvency has re-
mained an uncertain, yet substantial and potentially insurmountable
burden for partnership creditors.
In the 1978 Act, Congress has cured the shortcomings of the pres-
ent concept of partnership insolvency. Although the Act codifies the
existing concept as the definition of "partnership insolvency, '46 the re-
quirement of proof of partnership insolvency prior to the entry of an
order for relief has been eliminated. The only prerequisite to such an
order is a showing by the petitioning creditors that the partnership "is
generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due."47
This is the "equitable test" of insolvency which had been federal law
prior to the Act of 1898 and which is the law today under state proceed-
ings. The adoption of the equitable test eliminates the burden of locat-
ing and evaluating partners' assets and liabilities, the incongruous
treatment of exempt partner assets, and all uncertainties about pleading
with respect to partner solvency. Yet, perhaps unlike the reform pro-
posed in 1961, the new test is consistent with realities of the credit mar-
42. Horsky Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2-3.
43. See, e.g., McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4
U. CHi. L. REv. 369, 370 (1937).
44. Horsky Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2.
45. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 615; MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 257.
46. 1978 Act, supra note I, § 101(26)(B). The current rule is modified in one respect, in
that the partner's exempt individual assets are now excluded from consideration in deter-
mining the surplus of individual assets over liabilities. S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at
25; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 312.
47. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303(h)(1). Relief is also available upon a showing that a
custodian was appointed or took possession of substantially all the debtor's assets within 120
days prior to the filing of the petition. Id. § 303(h)(2).
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ketplace. In the case of an asset-poor partnership which has been
loaned funds in reliance on partner assets, the creditors of the partner-
ship justifiably have cause for concern when the partner assets are not
tendered directly or indirectly in satisfaction of partnership debts.
Under the new Act, however, the asset-poor partnership whose partners
act responsibly in light of their ultimate partnership liabilities is pro-
tected from bankruptcy administration.
Petitions by Partners
Under current law a partnership may seek a voluntary adjudica-
tion by a petition filed by all the general partners on behalf of the part-
nership.48 Such a petition is treated as any other voluntary petition and
leads to an automatic adjudication. In addition, a petition seeking an
adjudication may be filed on behalf of the partnership by fewer than all
general partners. While similar to a voluntary petition in that the filing
partners need not plead and prove an act of bankruptcy by the partner-
ship, such a petition must allege partnership insolvency.49 Such a peti-
tion must be served upon, and may be opposed by, the nonfiling
partners,50 who may advance any defense that normally would be
available to a debtor opposing a petition by creditors. 5' Additionally,
certain defenses peculiar to the partnership exist. The nonfiling part-
ners may deny existence of a partnership, 52 deny either partnership or
partner insolvency,53 or deny the filing partners' authority under either
state law or the governing partnership agreement to file a petition in
bankruptcy.54
Although praiseworthy for its pragmatism, the current law gov-
erning partnership petitions is in at least one respect too narrow. A
trustee conceivably may discover in the course of an individual pro-
ceeding the debtor's participation in a partnership, which could be a
source of creditor comfort either by furnishing assets in satisfaction of
48. Section 5(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1976)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 105. Simi-
larly, a partnership may petition for relief under Chapter XII by a petition filed by all the
general partners. FED. R. BANKR. P. 12-8.
49. Section 5(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1976)).
50. Section 18(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§41(a)-41(b) (1976)); FED. R. BANKR. P.
105(b), 111, 112.
51. In re W.C. Langley & Co., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Levy, Partner-
shps in Bankruptcy, 76 COM. L.J. 289 (1971).
52. See, e.g., Brandt & Brandt Printers v. Klein, 220 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955); Kaufman-
Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950); Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599
(9th Cir. 1943); In re Segal, 157 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
53. Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943).
54. In re W.C. Langley & Co., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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the debtor's interest or by the payment of obligations previously be-
lieved to be the separate debts of the bankrupt. Although the trustee
has statutory authority to administer the assets of the newly-discovered
partnership upon the consent of the other partners,55 the trustee essen-
tially is powerless in the face of opposition by those partners. Although
the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the partnership if a petition
seeking adjudication of the partnership is on file, the trustee of an indi-
vidual partner, who neither represents the creditors of the partnership
nor is authorized to file as a general partner on behalf of the partner-
ship, cannot file such a petition.56 The absence of broader statutory
authorization arguably has been the cause of fragmentation and dupli-
cation in bankruptcy administration.
The 1978 Act generally retains the substance of current law in this
regard. Unlike current law, however, there is no provision expressly
authorizing general partners to fie a petition on behalf of their partner-
ship; the Act simply provides that voluntary petitions can be filed by
the debtor.5 7 Ordinarily, a partnership may act through less than all of
its general partners, but the Act expressly classifies any petition filed on
behalf of a partnership by fewer than all its general partners as an "in-
voluntary case.''58 The import is that a partnership can commence a
voluntary proceeding only by the petition of all its general partners.59
A suit commenced by less than all the general partners is treated
much like any other involuntary proceeding under the new law. The
filing partners are treated as creditors for purposes of various provi-
sions incident to filing, such as statutory liability for a wrongfully filed
petition 6° and the requirement of an indemnity bond.61 The Act autho-
rizes nonjoining general partners to file an answer in opposition62 and
allows a trial on all defenses raised in opposition. 63 Thus, the Act re-
tains the basic contours of the adversary process when a partnership
proceeding is commenced by less than all partners.
In addition, the 1978 Act authorizes the trustee of a general part-
ner undergoing an individual proceeding to file an involuntary petition
55. Section 5(i) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(i) (1976)).
56. Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950); In re Segal, 157
F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
57. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 301.
58. Id. § 303(b)(3)(A).
59. S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at 33.
60. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303(i)(2).
61. Id. § 303(e).
62. Id. § 303(d).
63. Id. § 303(h).
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for the partnership if all of the general partners are in bankruptcy. 64
Because of the absence of broader authorization for the partner trustee,
in all likelihood bankruptcy courts will continue to be ill-equipped to
handle promptly and effectively those situations involving a "newly
discovered" partnership.
Partnership Petition When Partners Are Adjudicated
Existing law directs that when all general partners are adjudged
bankrupt, the partnership also will be adjudged bankrupt. 65 Such an
adjudication is available upon a petition by "any party in interest"; 66
opposition to the petition is not authorized under current law. Thus,
the formality of adjudicating the bankruptcy of a partnership when all
the partners have been adjudicated bankrupt will be undertaken only if
it is of some value to a party in interest.67
The new Act retains this approach, expressly authorizing a petition
against a partnership by any general partner, trustee, or creditor of the
partnership after all the partners are in proceedings. 68 Although a non-
filing general partner is authorized to file an answer to such a petition, 69
absent a denial of the existence of a partnership it is difficult to imagine
what defense might be raised under such circumstances.
Administration of the Estate
Selection of the Trustee
Existing law provides for creditors to meet after an adjudication of
a debtor and appoint a trustee70 to perform a variety of duties leading
to the ultimate liquidation of the estate.7 1 This procedure also applies
to partnership proceedings. The law directs that the trustee of an adju-
dicated partnership serve both in that capacity and as the trustee of the
individual estate of any general partner which is also being adminis-
tered, unless the partner's individual creditors show cause for appoint-
ment of a separate trustee.72 This statutory authorization of a separate
64. Id. § 303(b)(3)(B).
65. Section 5(i) (codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 23(i) (1976)).
66. FED. R. BANKR. P. 105(d).
67. See generally Rifkind, Automatic Adjudication of Partnerships Under Section 5(i) of
the BankruptAct, 64 COM. L.J. 321 (1959).
68. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303(b)(3)(B).
69. Id. § 303(d).
70. Sections 44, 45 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 72(a), 73 (1976)).
71. Sections 44, 45 (codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 75 (1976)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 209.
72. Section 5(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(c) (1976)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 210(e).
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trustee for individual estates was added by the Chandler Act in 1938 to
resolve judicial uncertainty about the court's prerogatives. By that
time, courts had recognized that, while administrative convenience or-
dinarily justified the appointment of a single trustee, a conflict could
arise between a trustee's responsibilities to the partnership estate and to
the estates of individual partners. Such conflicts arose, for example,
when the partnership appeared to have a significant claim against a
partner73 or when a partner was bound contractually to indemnify a
third party against claims asserted by the partnership. 74 Although
many courts prior to 1938 concluded that in such instances they had
implicit authority to appoint a separate trustee,75 at least one court de-
clined to do so for want of express statutory authorization. 76
The new Act discards this specific authorization, returning uncer-
tainty to this area. Partnership creditors will no longer control the se-
lection of the partner's trustee,77 and thus a greater frequency of
multiple trustees in joint proceedings may result. Absent a conflict of
interest, the election of multiple trustees would appear to be wasteful.
The new Act's elimination of judicial scrutiny of the trustee selection
process is, in this respect, unfortunate. On the other hand, if a single
trustee is used and a true conflict of interest does arise, the court can
exercise authority under the new Act to remove the trustee from the
administration of one estate or the other.78 If necessary, the court ar-
guably could go a step further and appoint a separate trustee for the
estate of the individual partner, invoking its general authority to issue
appropriate orders to carry out the provisions of the Act.79
Administration by the Partnership Trustee
The rights and responsibilities of the trustee of an adjudicated
partnership have been the subject of much discussion, particularly as
they bear upon the assets of partners. In the case of adjudicated part-
ners, for whom the partnership trustee ordinarily is serving as trustee,
73. See, e.g., In re Coe, 154 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
74. See, e.g., In re Currie, 197 F. 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1910).
75. See, e.g., In re Wood, 248 F. 246 (6th Cir. 1918); In re Currie, 197 F. 1012 (E.D.
Mich. 1910); In re Beck, 110 F. 140 (D. Mass. 1901).
76. In re Coe, 154 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
77. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 702. Of course, where partnership creditors have filed a
majority of the claims against an individual debtor, they will in fact control the election of
the individual trustee.
78. Id. § 324.
79. Id. § 105(a); See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at 92; H.R. RPp. No. 95-595,
supra note 17, at 198.
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current law offers fairly clear guidance. The trustee must keep separate
accounts of partnership and partner assets and expenses, marshal the
assets of each estate, and, after claims are received, apply the net pro-
ceeds of partnership assets for the satisfaction of partnership debts
while applying the net proceeds of partner assets for the satisfaction of
the separate debts of the partner.80
The rights and duties of the trustee with respect to assets of part-
ners not then adjudicated are a matter of much greater uncertainty.
The present statute does not address the subject explicitly, and develop-
ments in this area have been more judicial policymaking than statutory
construction. The landmark case was Francis v. McNeal,8' in which
the Supreme Court sustained an order of the bankruptcy court requir-
ing a nonadjudicated, although insolvent, partner to turn over individ-
ual assets for administration by the partnership trustee. From this and
similar cases emerged the doctrine that, in appropriate circumstances, a
partnership trustee may administer the personal estates of nonadjudi-
cated partners in the course of a partnership bankruptcy even when
such a partner personally has not committed any act of bankruptcy,
may be statutorily exempt from proceedings in bankruptcy, and will
not obtain a discharge at the conclusion of the administration.8 2
The premise of these powers is the fundamental precept of "liabili-
ty in solido": each partner is jointly and severally liable for partnership
obligations remaining unsatisfied after the application of partnership
assets.83 The current bankruptcy statute expressly directs that the sur-
plus separate property of each partner is to be applied to any such defi-
ciency.84 Further, the partnership trustee is entitled to that surplus,
considered a partnership asset, regardless of whether the partners are in
bankruptcy, are solvent or insolvent, or are acquiescent or truculent
toward the trustee.85 The courts have found this authorization to ad-
minister the estate of a nonadjudicated bankrupt implicit in the part-
nership trustee's duty to collect the surplus.86
80. Sections 5(e)-5(h) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 23(e)-23(h) (1976)). Any proceeds re-
maining in either estate are applied to the creditors of the other. See text accompanying
notes 135-36 infra.
81. 228 U.S. 695 (1913).
82. See, e.g., In re Jercyn Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Duke
& Son, 199 F. 199 (N.D. Ga. 1912) (exemption).
83. See, e.g., Mills v. J.H. Fisher & Co. 159 F. 897, 900 (6th Cir. 1908). But cf UNI-
FORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (recognizing joint liability in certain instances).
84. Section 5(g) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1976)).
85. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 625.
86. See, e.g., In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Since limited
partners do not face liability in so/ido, one court quite properly concluded that the trustee of
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Although one might challenge the logic of this reasoning,87 most
critics instead have lamented the myriad uncertainties involved in an
administration of separate property by the partnership trustee.88 Trus-
tees routinely have required that the nonadjudicated partner file a
schedule of assets and liabilities.89 The authority of the trustee in this
regard is now provided by rule.90 In appropriate situations, a trustee
can secure the issuance of a turnover order directed at a portion or all
of the separate estate9 although a court may first require a showing by
the trustee that the partnership assets are in fact insufficient to meet
partnership liabilities.92
Whether the trustee must secure such an order regarding the entire
separate estate is unclear. One court has indicated that the nonadjudi-
cated partner remains free to encumber or dispose of his or her estate
until the partnership trustee either obtains title thereto under a court
order or takes possession of the assets. 93 The contours of the trustee's
existing duties with respect to separate assets, however, remain ill-de-
fined.94 There are neither simple procedures by which the trustee can
determine the value of the surplus of such assets nor criteria for the
selection of assets to be liquidated and applied to the partnership defi-
ciency.95 While most authorities agree that separate assets seized but
a limited partnership has no authority to administer the estate of a nonadjudicated limited
partner. In re Tommie's Dine & Dance, 102 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1952).
87. See Rifikind, The Dilemma of Parnershp Bankruptcy Administration Under Present
Section 5 ofthe BankruptcyAct, 33 J. NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 108 (1959). An argument like
Rifkind's was rejected in In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
88. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 626; MacLachlan, supra note 8; Note, Partner-
ship Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 105 (1940); Unaccomplished
Reforms, supra note 5, at 923-24.
89. Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 F. 97 (8th Cir. 1915); Dickas v. Barnes, 140 F. 849 (6th
Cir. 1905); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Sugar Valley
Gen. Co., 292 F. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1923).
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 108(c).
91. In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); J. MOORE, DEBTORS'
AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 471-72 (1955).
92. In re Petroleum Corp. of America, 417 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1969).
93. Tate v. Hoover, 345 Pa. 19, 26 A.2d 665, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942).
94. See, e.g., In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Sugar
Valley Gen. Co., 292 F. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1923); In re Georgalas Bros. 245 F. 129 (N.D. Ohio
1917); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 632-40; Rifkind, The Dilemma of Partnership Bankruptcy
Under Present Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 J. NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 108 (1959).
95. One issue of recent controversy is the power of a bankruptcy court, at the request of
the partnership trustee, to enjoin enforcement of liens on the assets of nonadjudicated part-
ners. The Supreme Court's opinion in Liberty National Bank v. Bear, 276 U.S. 215 (1928),
contains broad language to the effect that lienors and creditors of separate partners cannot
be affected by a partnership proceeding. Subsequent lower court decisions have narrowed
this principle, concluding that while courts cannot interfere with the efforts of a creditor to
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not so applied should be returned to the partner rather than individual
creditors, even this is not entirely free from doubt.96 Finally, there is
considerable uncertainty about the manner in which the trustee and the
court should respond if an individual proceeding by or against the part-
ner commences after the partnership proceeding is well underway.
The lack of clear statutory authority for such trustee prerogatives,
uncertainty as to their limits, and a sense of the unfairness of subjecting
a nonadjudicated partner to the burdens of bankruptcy administration
have engendered considerable criticism of this expanded authority of
the partnership trustee. In 1962, the National Bankruptcy Conference
proposed that section 5(d) of the current bankruptcy law be amended
to provide a more formal and precise procedure. That proposal, al-
though not enacted, would have allowed the bankruptcy court enter-
taining a partnership proceeding, upon proper notice and hearing, to
determine the amount of deficiency of partnership assets and render a
judgment in the amount of such deficiency against each of the general
partners in favor of the trustee. The proposal also would have allowed
the court to enter an order fixing an amount of security for payment of
that deficiency.97
Now, more than sixteen years later, Congress has adopted an ap-
proach strikingly similar to that proposal. Under the new Act, each
general partner in a debtor partnership will be liable to the partnership
trustee for any deficiency in partnership assets. 98 The Act also directs
secure an inpersonam judgment against the nonadjudicated partner, it may enjoin attempts
to satisfy that judgment by levy of execution or foreclosure. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
Herkimer v. Polan Union, 109 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1940). Accordingly, two partnership trustees
recently have sought and secured injunctions against the foreclosure of liens on the separate
assets or legal title of a nonadjudicated general partner. In re Elemar Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1151 (N.D. Ga. 1976). This development, largely justified as necessary to preserve the
surplus in an individual's estate, is another instance of extending partnership trustee powers
beyond those suggested by a strict entity theory of partnership.
96. Unaccomplished Reforms, supra note 5, at 923 n. 117.
97. H.R. 10009, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REC. 1385 (1962). See note 8 supra.
The Conference considered a proposal, but did not recommend, that the bankruptcy court
have jurisdiction to enter an order vesting title to all the property of nonadjudicated general
partners, save for exempt assets, in the partnership trustee. As to such property, following
vesting the trustee would enjoy all the rights of a "perfected lien creditor" under §§ 67 and
70 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110 (1976)). See Rifkind, Proposed Revision ofBankruptcy,
Act Relating to Partnership Administration, 34 J. NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 72 (1960). That
approach has been more than once advocated by commentators critical of the current uncer-
tainties in this field. See, e.g., Unaccomplished Reforms, supra note 5.
98. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 723(a). Section 723 provides in full:
"(a) If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims allowed in
a case under this title concerning a partnership, then each general partner in such partner-
ship is liable to the trustee for the full amount of such deficiency.
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the trustee to first seek recovery of the deficiency from nonadjudicated
general partners.99 In addition, even prior to determining the extent of
the deficiency, the trustee may seek from the court an order directing
that security be posted by a nonadjudicated general partner to ensure
that there is no dissipation of that partner's separate property. °°
Lurking behind this reform, however, remains the question of
whether the partnership trustee continues to enjoy prerogatives to col-
lect, evaluate, preserve, liquidate, and otherwise manage the separate
estates of the nonadjudicated partners. As noted above,' 0 ' these pre-
rogatives were not strictly dependent on particular statutory language,
and thus the elimination of almost all of section 5 is not necessarily
determinative.
Circumstances surrounding this reform suggest that the trustee
should not continue to have such powers. First, the partnership is
given an express statutory cause of action for the amount of any defi-
ciency. The legislative history of this provision reveals the congres-
sional intent to create a right of action which is not self-executing, but
which the partnership trustee must initiate to enforce, presumably in a
judicial forum. 0 2 Second, the revision is conceptually, if not linguisti-
"(b) To the extent practicable, the trustee shall first seek recovery of such deficiency
from any general partner in such partnrship that is not a debtor in a case under this title.
Pending determination of such deficiency, the court may order any such partner to provide
the estate with indemnity for, or assurance of payment of, any deficiency recoverable from
such partner, or not to dispose of property.
"(c) Notwithstanding section 728(c) of this title, the trustee has a claim against the
estate of each general partner in such partnership that is a debtor in a case under this title for
the full amount of all claims of creditors allowed in the case concerning such partnership.
Notwithstanding section 502 of this title, there shall not be allowed in such case a claim
against such partner on which both such partner and such partnership are liable, except to
any extent that such claim is secured only by property of such partner and not be property of
such partnership. The claim of the trustee under this subsection is entitled to distribution in
such case under section 726(a) of this title the same as any other claim of the kind specified
in such section.
"(d) If the aggregate that the trustee recovers from the estates of general partners
under subsection (c) of this section is greater than any deficiency not recovered under sub-
section (b) of this section, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine an equitable
distribution of the surplus so recovered, and the trustee shall distribute such surplus to the
estates of the general partners in such partnership according to such determination."
99. Id. § 723(b).
100. Id.
101. See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
102. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200. Actually the partnership trustee may
have several causes of action against the nonadjudicated partner, and, as noted in the legis-
lative history, they are not entirely congruous. Section 723(a) provides a cause of action
against nonadjudicated partners for any deficiency in payment of all claims allowed. In
contrast, the trustee has a cause of action under § 723(c) against adjudicated partners for the
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cally, strikingly similar to the National Bankruptcy Conference propo-
sal, which was, in a real sense, a recommendation to retract the
partnership trustee's authority to roam. 0 3
Despite this analysis, in light of the broad discretion of the court
under the new Act, t°4 partnership trustees probably will continue to
seek a variety of managerial orders regarding the estates of nonadjudi-
cated partners. The rules will continue to require the filing of a sched-
ule of assets and liabilities, 10 5 which arguably is necessary to determine
whether security for a deficiency is required.10 6 In some circumstances,
particularly after the rendition of a judgment against the partner, a
court may grant the trustee's request for a turnover order, although it is
doubtful that one should ever apply to the assets of an exempt partner.
Finally, the legislative history of the Act suggests that the court's au-
thority to enjoin a partner's creditor from levying on the separate prop-
erty of the partner is continued. 107
Administration of Partnership Estate by Partner Trustee
A mirror image of the foregoing issues appears when a general
"full amount of all claims of creditors allowed." The Act directs that the trustee shall seek
recovery of the deficiency first from nonadjudicated general partners, and apparently the
trustee has complete prosecutorial discretion if there is more than one partner against whom
he or she might proceed. In turn, however, the nonadjudicated partner who contributes
more than a proportionate share of assets, based on his or her interest in partnership profits,
in satisfaction of a partnership deficiency would probably have a claim against those not
contributing their fair share. See Glasswell v. Prentiss, 175 Cal. App. 2d 599, 346 P.2d 895
(1959); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(f).
Generally the partnership trustee also has a cause of action under state law against
nonadjudicated partners for contribution in the event of any deficiency in assets. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40. This cause is a part of the partnership estate and may be asserted
by the trustee. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 541(a); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200.
However, such matters can be subject to an agreement between the partners limiting the
liability of a particular partner, and among them and their successors such agreements are
effective. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 118 Colo. 524, 198 P.2d 453 (1948).
103. As noted above, the Conference originally considered a statutory amendment pro-
viding for a court order vesting in the trustee title to the entire separate estate of each
nonadjudicated partner and giving him or her perfected lien rights in such assets. See note
97 supra. This suggestion was condemned as unnecessarily increasing the unilateral intru-
sion of the trustee into the affairs of potentially solvent partners, and as aggravating the
uncertainties as to practice and procedure attendant to this form of aggregate asset adminis-
tration. See, e.g., MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 258; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 633. In the
face of such criticisms, the provision was dropped from the Conference's final proposal in
favor of an approach considered more certain and less intrusive.
104. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 105.
105. FED. R. BANKR. P. 108(c).
106. See note 99 supra.
107. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 199-200.
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partner is adjudicated while the partnership in which he or she has an
interest is not: What are the rights of the partner's trustee with respect
to partnership property?
There is considerably greater statutory guidance to answer this
question. Current law provides:
In the event of one or more but not all of the general partners of a
partnership being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership property shall
not be administered in bankruptcy, unless by consent of the general
partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt; but such general partner
or partners not adjudged bankrupt shall settle the partnership busi-
ness as expeditiously as its nature will permit and account for the
interest of the general partner or partners adjudged bankrupt. 10 8
Ordinarily, the bankruptcy of a general partner dissolves the part-
nership and initiates the process of winding up its affairs. 0 9 The bank-
ruptcy law reflects the congressional judgment that in most cases
winding up the affairs of the partnership outside the bankruptcy proc-
ess will be more convenient and productive for all concerned. Based on
this rationale several courts have held that a bankruptcy court has no
jurisdiction to administer partnership assets under such circumstances
absent the consent of all nonadjudicated partners. 110 Further, the only
right of the partner's trustee is to demand settlement of the partner's
interest in the partnership, "' to which the trustee succeeded upon the
filing of the petition."l 2 Despite such holdings, not only do partner
trustees continue to influence the management of partnership assets,
but there is authority for the proposition that a trustee may seek and
secure from the bankruptcy court an order enjoining foreclosure upon
or disposition of partnership assets. 1 3 Such control of the partnership
estate is justified as necessary to the performance of the trustee's duty to
protect and preserve the partner's interest in the partnership. Other
courts, however, have found the granting of such relief inconsistent
with the restriction on jurisdiction imposed by section 5(i) and have
denied the trustee even this measure of control.114
108. Section 5(i) (codified at I1 U.S.C. § 23(i) (1976)).
109. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(5).
110. Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 110 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1940); Sturm v. Ulrich, 10
F.2d 9, 14 (8th Cir. 1925); In re Segal, 157 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
III. Turner v. Central Nat'l Bank of Mattson, 468 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Dixon,
I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1648 (S.D. Ohio 1975). This rule differs from state law, which generally
entitles every partner, including successors in interest, to participate in the winding up of the
partnership affairs. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 37.
112. Kerry v. Schneider, 239 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1957).
113. In re Royal Inns of America, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1168 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (Chapter
X).
114. Hammerman v. Arlington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 385 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1967);
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The 1978 Act defines the partner's estate to include his or her in-
terest in a partnership, but contains no provision comparable to section
5(i). The implications of the elimination of that section remain unclear.
In the absence of an express prohibition against administration of the
partnership estate, courts may enjoin more readily the foreclosure or
disposition of such assets, or possibly grant other forms of relief
amounting to trustee interference in partnership affairs." 15 Conceiva-
bly, the full panoply of filings, turnovers, and the like seen in the part-
nership proceeding may occur in a partner proceeding, although the
justification for such administrative practices against a nonadjudicated
person in this instance is weaker. In light of this prospect of increased
interference in and supervision of partnership affairs by the partner
trustee, the alternative of consensual administration in the bankruptcy
court may seem less forbidding to the solvent partners.
Ironically, the express authorization for consensual administration
has been eliminated by the new Act. The source of authority for the
trustee and court to undertake such management is consequently quite
uncertain. A number of cases have intimated that the jurisdiction or
power of the court and trustee to administer the partnership estate
would not exist but for the specific language of section 5(i) and the
consent of the nonadjudicated partners. 116 Hopefully, where welcomed
by the partners out of bankruptcy, such consensual administrations will
be continued in the absence of a specific statutory reference.
Exemptions
Current bankruptcy law embraces bankruptcy exemptions from
creditor claims created by state law as well as the few exemptions cre-
ated by other federal law." 17 With respect to partners and partnerships,
state laws are not particularly generous. Apparently no state recognizes
a partnership as a separate judicial entity entitled to the benefit of an
exemption or homestead." 18 While partners who are natural persons
usually may avail themselves of such laws, only a very few states, fol-
Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 110 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1940); In re Panitz & Co., 270 F.
Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1967) (Chapter X).
115. In In re Dixon, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1648 (S.D. Ohio 1975), the court felt itself bound
to deny the petition of a partner trustee for an order invalidating the transfer of partnership
property to a relative of the general partners in satisfaction of an antecedent debt. The court
reasoned that it was prohibited from granting such relief by the presence of § 5(i), which it
termed a "horse and buggy jurisdictional requirement." Id. at 1649.
116. See note 110 supra.
117. Section 6 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)).
118. D. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 726 (2d ed. 1978).
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lowing what might be characterized as a "pure" aggregate theory, per-
mit individual partners to shield partnership assets with their
individual exemptions." 9 As a result, a powerful incentive exists for
partners to transfer partnership assets to their individual accounts prior
to an anticipated insolvency.' 20 In turn, the prevalence of such trans-
fers led to the enactment of a special provision condemning as fraud on
partnership creditors all such transfers within one year of the partner-
ship insolvency.12' Any asset subject to such recovery in a partnership
proceeding probably cannot be claimed as exempt in a partner's indi-
vidual proceeding.' 22
The new Act represents a significant reform with respect to exemp-
tions, making available a set of federal bankruptcy exemptions as an
alternative to state law exemptions. The Act has very few implications
for partnership and partner proceedings, however, as only "individual
debtors" are entitled to the alternate federal exemptions,23-apparently
evidencing a congressional intent to make the exemptions unavailable
to partnerships. Furthermore, partners are not necessarily favored
more under the federal exemptions than under current state law be-
cause the federal exemptions may be applied only to assets that would
otherwise be in the debtor's estate.' 24 Thus, a partner cannot shield
partnership assets under either the new federal or current state exemp-
tions.
Trustee Avoidance Powers
A fundamental premise of the bankruptcy law is that similarly sit-
uated creditors should receive proportionately equal benefit from the
debtor's estate irrespective of individual collection efforts during, or
immediately preceding, the onset of formal bankruptcy. Accordingly,
the trustee in bankruptcy is given powers to invalidate certain transac-
tions occuring prior to bankruptcy which would have the effect of dis-
torting an otherwise proportionate distribution. Perhaps most
119. Texas, for example. See Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.
1959). In most states the Uniform Partnership Act bars partners from claiming homestead
or other exemptions in partnership property. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25(2)(c).
120. See, e.g., In re Reese, 223 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
121. Section 67(d)(4) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(4) (1976)). See notes 127-45 & ac-
companying text infra.
122. Section 6 (codified at I I U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) is not directly applicable, and no case
squarely on point has been found. See generaly, IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.1112]
(14th ed. 1978).
123. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 522.
124. Id. § 522(b).
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important among these are the power to nullify certain transactions in
which a legitimate creditor's position was improved by receiving pay-
ment or security in the debtor's assets (a "preference") 25 and the power
to invalidate gifts and transfers intended to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors ("fraudulent conveyances"). 126
Preferences
Any transfer within four months prior to the filing of the debtor's
petition of the debtor's property to, or for the benefit of, a creditor for
an existing debt occuring while the debtor is insolvent is deemed a pref-
erence if its effect is to enable the recipient to receive satisfaction of a
greater percentage of the debt than similarly situated creditors will re-
ceive in the proceeding.127 A preference may be avoided by the trustee
if either the creditor or the creditor's agent had, at the time of the trans-
fer, reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent. 128 In the part-
nership setting, a transfer by a debtor partner to a separate creditor is
potentially voidable, as is a transfer by a partnership to a partnership
creditor. 29 In addition, under the line of cases exemplified by Mills P.
JH. Fisher & Co.,' 30 a transfer by a debtor partner to a creditor of the
partnership is also voidable by the partner's trustee because a partner-
ship creditor is also the creditor of the individual partner, and the
transfer impermissibly favors one individual creditor over others.
Authority also exists for the obverse rule: a transfer by a partner-
ship of partnership assets to an individual creditor constitutes a prefer-
ence voidable by the partnership trustee.' 3 ' The cases so holding,
however, fail to persuasively justify this conclusion which seems to
have been adopted simply because of its superficial symmetry to the
Mills rule. Such a conclusion is not appropriate as it is doubtful
125. Section 60 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976)).
126. Section 67(d) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976)). The trustee also has the
power to nullify certain liens against the bankrupt obtained prior to bankruptcy, §§ 67(a)-
67(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(a)-107(c) (1976)), the power to nullify transfers and liens
ineffective under state law, § 70(e) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1976)), and the powers of
a lien creditor under nonbankruptcy law, § 70(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § I 10(c) (1976)).
127. Section 60(a) (codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976)).
128. Section 60(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976)).
129. Logically, the former is not avoidable by the partnership's trustee in the partnership
proceeding, and the latter is not avoidable by a partner's trustee in an individual proceeding.
See, e.g., Turner v. Central Nat'l Bank of Mattson, 468 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1972); In re
Merrill, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 236 (D. Vt. 1975). Here the entity theory is strictly observed.
130. 159 F. 897 (6th Cir. 1908).
131. Gooch v. Stone, 257 F. 631 (6th Cir. 1919); In re W.J. Floyd & Co., 156 F. 206
(E.D.N.C. 1907); In re Jones, 100 F. 781 (E.D. Mo. 1900); In re Gillette, 104 F. 769
(W.D.N.Y. 1900).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
whether such a transfer meets the definitional prerequisites of a prefer-
ence. The separate creditor of a partner in the bankrupt partnership is
not a creditor of the debtor within the meaning of the provision (de-
spite the creditor's indirect, yet very real, interest in any surplus part-
nership property distributable to the partner). 32 Quite unlike the Mills
circumstances, there is no liability in solido, and the transfer would not
prefer one partnership creditor over another.' 33 Under many circum-
stances, however, such transfers should constitute a fraudulent convey-
ance and should be attacked on that ground. 34
The 1978 Act significantly revises some aspects of the preference
provisions and modernizes the terminology involved. The revisions en-
hance the trustee's powers generally by eliminating the need to prove
the creditor's state of mind for transfers within ninety days of bank-
ruptcy and by creating a presumption of insolvency during that period.
Unfortunately, the changes do not have specific implications for either
partnership or partner proceedings and leave the partnership prefer-
ence rules in their current, imperfect state.' 35
Fraudulent Conveyances
Current law gives the trustee the right to set aside as a fraud upon
the creditors transfers of assets or obligations incurred by the debtor.
In some circumstances, a transfer or obligation made or incurred
within twelve months prior to the filing of the debtor's petition can be
challenged,136 although in other instances only a transfer or obligation
within four months is suspect. 37 These powers are fully available to
the trustee in either a partnership or partner proceeding.' 38
Current law specifically grants to the partnership trustee an addi-
tional power of considerable significance. Under present law, a trans-
132. In re Ginsberg, 219 F.2d 472, 473 (3d Cir. 1955).
133. There may be other reasons for concluding this transfer is not a § 60 preference.
For example, the individual partner transferring partnership assets to an individual creditor
is probably acting beyond the scope of his or her authority, so it can be said that the debtor,
Ze., the partnership, has taken no action at all.
134. See In re Jercyn Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1975).
135. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 547. See generaly H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17,
at 177-79. Another reform, the rejection of the "jingle rule," may provide inspiration for the
courts to rectify this problem, as both aberrations stem from a mistaken appreciation for
superficial symmetry. See notes 152-53 & accompanying text infra.
136. Section 67(d)(2) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)).
137. Section 67(d)(3) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976)). In addition, the trustee
may attack such transfer on state law grounds. Section 70(e) (codified at II U.S.C. § 110(e)
(1976)).
138. See, e.g., In re Clark Supply Co., 172 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1949).
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fer of partnership property or the incurring of a partnership obligation
within one year prior to the filing of a petition by or against the part-
nership is fraudulent as to the partnership creditors without regard to
the actual intent of the partnership or its partners if two conditions are
met. First, the partnership must be insolvent at the time of the transfer
or be rendered insolvent thereby. Second, the transfer or obligation
must be made to or incurred by a partner, or be made to or incurred by
one other than a partner without fair consideration to the partner-
ship.' 39 This provision effectively condemns not only most transfers of
property from a partnership in financial distress to either a partner or
that partner's separate creditor, but also the assumption of obligations
of these persons by such a partnership. The purpose of the provision is
to protect the legitimate partnership creditor whose right to have part-
nership property applied in payment of partnership debts is impaired
by such transfers and obligations and who would otherwise be rele-
gated to a subordinate status.' 40
One prerequisite to the exercise of this power is that the partner-
ship be insolvent at the time of the transfer or thereby rendered insol-
vent. Neither the consent or good faith of the partners, nor the
ignorance of the transferee, can save a transfer of partnership property
or the incurring of a partnership obligation when partnership insol-
vency is shown. 14 1 For this purpose, partnership insolvency is defined
expressly in the statute as existing when partnership liabilities exceed
partnership assets and surplus individual assets.' 42
Most importantly, once insolvency is demonstrated, the fact that
the recipient partner gave fair consideration in exchange for the trans-
ferred asset or obligation is no defense. This prophylactic rule is in-
tended to preclude a defense based upon the partner's promise to a
dying partnership to pay for the assets received by it. Absent such a
rule, a transfer in consideration for an unfulfilled promise would re-
duce the ultimate recovery of the partnership creditors in favor of the
partner's separate creditors. 143 The rule goes somewhat further, how-
ever, condemning all transfers to a partner and obligations in favor of a
partner within one year of the partnership's bankruptcy, including
transfers and obligations between a firm and one of its partners or cred-
itors of that partner, which do not injure the partnership creditors and,
139. Section 67(d)(4) (codified at II U.S.C. § 107(d)(4) (1976)).
140. In re Venie, 80 F. Supp. 250, 255 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
141. Id.; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 67.39, at 560-61 (14th ed. 1978).
142. Section 67(d)(1)(d) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(l)(d) (1976)).
143. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 67.39, at 564-65 (14th ed. 1978).
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in fact, can facilitate the orderly winding up of partnership affairs. 44
To eliminate this "hardship on a partner and his creditors which the
present language . . . permits,"' 45 the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence unsuccessfully proposed a reform of this rule to permit a defense
of fair, equivalent value.146
The new Act generally continues the existing law in this area. The
Act retains those powers to challenge fraudulent conveyances which
are available to any trustee, including one in a partnership bank-
ruptcy. 147 In addition, the Act contains a special grant of power to the
partnership trustee 48 in terms quite similar to current section 67d(4).149
A transfer of partnership property or the incurring of an obligation by
the partnership will be subject to attack if made to a general partner
within one year prior to the proceeding and if the debtor was insolvent
on the date of transfer or obligation or became insolvent as a result. ' 50
Because the new Act continues to condemn partnership transfers
and obligations without regard to whether any consideration is given in
exchange by the recipient partner, the criticism that the law unnecessa-
rily invalidates legitimate transactions will continue to be heard. The
historical purpose of the rule was to protect partnership creditors from
the subordination they would suffer if they were forced to claim against
individual assets rather than partnership assets. As discussed below,' 5 '
however, the partnership creditor will enjoy equal status with other
creditors under the new Act, which should reduce somewhat the prob-
lem to be solved by section 67d(4). Thus, criticism of the overbreadth
of the rule is perhaps even more forceful after the 1978 Act.
Distributions
Distribution of the debtor's assets in partnership bankruptcy has
been governed for more than a century by a rule of dual priorities.
This rule states that partnership creditors enjoy priority in partnership
assets, and individual creditors of a partner enjoy priority in the part-
144. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 622-24; MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 258.
145. Horsky Memorandum, supra note 8, at 8.
146. Id.
147. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 548(a); see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 199.
148. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 548(b).
149. Section 67(d)(4) (codified at It U.S.C. § 107(d)(4) (1976)).
150. Deleted from new § 548(b) is the provision in current § 67(d)(4)(b) (codified at I 1
U.S.C. § 107(d)(4)(b) (1976)) with respect to conveyances to third parties for less than fair
consideration. However, such transfers and obligations are generally condemned under
§ 548(a) of the 1978 Act.
151. See notes 193-94 & accompanying text infra.
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ner's separate assets, with any remainder going to the benefit of the
other group of creditors. 52 This so-called "jingle rule"'153 has been
codified in both the current bankruptcy law and the Uniform Partner-
ship Act and controls both federal bankruptcy and state insolvency
proceedings. The new Act represents a dramatic revision of this rule.
Partnership Proceedings
Under the current law, claims against a partnership estate may be
filed by a partnership creditor, by the estate of a partner, 54 or by a
partner's separate creditor. 155 The claim of the partner's estate or sepa-
rate creditor, however, is subordinated expressly by statute 56 to the
claims of the partnership creditors. 157 Partnership assets are applied
first in satisfaction of the filed claims of partnership creditors and ad-
ministrative expenses. If any assets remain, they are distributed to sol-
vent and insolvent partners, or the trustees or creditors of the latter, in
proportion to their interests in the partnership. Thus, absolute priority
in partnership assets is given to partnership creditors, which may well
leave nothing from the partnership estate.' 58 This subordination is
warranted because of the nature of the partnership agreement, which
requires that partnership debts be satisfied before the equities between
the partners are settled. 159
If the partnership assets are insufficient to meet partnership liabili-
ties, the trustee will apply surplus individual assets, which are subject to
trustee management throughout the proceeding, to that deficiency.
There are no statutory provisions or rules in current law outlining the
procedures to be followed or the order in which surplus individual as-
sets are to be utilized.
The 1978 Act is characterized by broad definitions including an
expansive definition of "claim" which arguably includes the contingent
interest of a partner and the partner's trustee and creditors in partner-
152. See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 91, 93 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as CRANE & BROMBERG].
153. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 630 n.86.
154. Section 5(h) (codified at I1 U.S.C. § 23(h) (1976)).
155. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.22, at 731 n.4 (14th ed. 1978).
156. Section 5(g) (codified at II U.S.C. § 23(g) (1976)).
157. See, e.g., In re Tuerk, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 223 (S.D. Fla. 1974); IA COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 5.22, at 730-32 (14th ed. 1978).
158. For obvious reasons an individual creditor may attempt to characterize his or her
claim as a partnership debt. See, e.g., Eads Hide & Wool Co. v. Merrill, 252 F.2d 80 (10th
Cir. 1958); In re Tuerk, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 223 (S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Rudy, 25 F. Supp. 912
(W.D. Ky. 1939).
159. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 152, § 91A.
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ship assets. 60 Such entities apparently are authorized to file proofs of
claim in partnership proceedings.' 6' Moreover, the Act does not ex-
pressly subordinate the interests of these claimants to those of the part-
nership creditors, and under the Act's rule of priorities in
distribution, 62 such claimants would seem to be deserving of equal
treatment. The Act should not be so construed, however, because to do
so would eliminate the priority in partnership assets to which partner-
ship creditors are entitled by the nature of partnership. There is no
indication in the Act's legislative history of any congressional intent to
eliminate this long-standing priority.
The priority provisions of the new Act direct the final distribution
of remaining assets in an estate "to the debtor."'163 In the case of a
partnership proceeding, however, the effect of liquidation is to com-
plete the winding up of the affairs of a dissolved partnership; at its con-
clusion the debtor no longer exists. With respect to these proceedings,
therefore, this provision should be interpreted as directing the distribu-
tion of any surplus of partnership property to the individual partners or
their estates in bankruptcy in accordance with their interests in the
partnership.
If partnership assets are insufficient to satisfy partnership debts,
the trustee has a claim against nonadjudicated partners and, if recovery
from their estates is insufficient, against debtor partners undergoing in-
dividual proceedings.164 Against insolvent partners, the trustee has a
claim for the "full amount of all claims of [partnership] creditors,"'165
which is potentially much larger than that for only the deficiency of
partnership assets, thereby enhancing the relief given partnership credi-
tors. 166 Although the language does not seem to so indicate, the legisla-
tive history of this provision states that the trustee's claim includes a
claim for unpaid administrative expenses. 67
If the aggregate amount recovered from the estates of debtor part-
ners exceeds the partnership's deficiency, the Act directs the court to
160. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 101(4).
161. Id. § 501.
162. Id. § 726.
163. Id. § 726(a)(6).
164. Id. § 723(b).
165. Id. § 723(c).
166. Under state law, the partnership has only the right to claim against partners for
unpaid deficiencies, to which right the trustee succeeds by operation of law. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 40; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200. This § 723 claim is
significantly broader and favors partnership creditors to the disadvantage of individual cred-
itors.
167. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200.
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distribute equitably that excess to the estates of the general partners.
The Act does not specify a particular equitable formula for redistribu-
tion, however, and competing formulae have been proposed. 68 Uncer-
tainty thus remains regarding the formula that will be followed by the
courts.
Partner Proceedings
Probably the single most important and most warranted reform in
partnership bankruptcy is the change brought by the new Act in the
rule governing distribution of the estate of a partner in bankruptcy.
Under existing law, claims may be filed against a partner's estate by
separate creditors, by partnership creditors, and by the partnership es-
tate itself. 169 Section 5(g) imposes a rule of priorities for distribution in
satisfaction of these claims that is the second stanza of the jingle rule:
the net proceeds of the individual estate must be applied first to pay-
ment of the "individual debts," and any remaining surplus must be
added to the partnership assets and applied to the payment of partner-
ship debts. The statutory terminology is regrettably imprecise, as each
partner is individually liable in solido for the debts of the partner-
ship; 70 most courts hold that a partnership creditor claiming against a
partner only on that theory is not asserting an "individual debt" within
the meaning of section 5(g).17' The result is to favor a partner's sepa-
rate creditors over partnership creditors seeking to hold the partner ac-
countable for the partnership's obligation.
This priority has been the subject of scathing criticism. Since the
claim of the partnership creditor to individual assets is in some sense
stronger than the claim of the individual creditor against partnership
assets, some commentators argue that to relegate the two classes to the
168. Compare H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 201 (endorsing distribution ac-
cording to responsibility for partnership liabilities) with id. at 381 (suggesting various fac-
tors) and S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at 95 (same).
169. Section 5(h) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(h) (1976)). The partnership creditors may
claim, of course, because each partner is liable in solido for the debts of the partnership.
170. See, e.g., Rochelle v. United States, 521 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1975).
171. See, e.g., In re Saratoga Dev. Corp., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1373 (S.D. Cal. 1978). This
no doubt has prompted partnership creditors to seek more frequently individual partner
guarantees of partnership obligations, although one might question the efficacy of a guaran-
tee of a debt one is already legally bound to pay. D. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRAC-
TICE § 731, at 478 n.84 (2d ed. 1978). State laws now generally recognize the ability of the
individual partner to validly so contract. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15(b). Such sepa-
rate guarantees constitute "individual debts" entitled to priority in an individual proceeding.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hampel, 276 U.S. 299 (1928); In re Allen, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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same subordinated status is illogical and unfair.172 More pragmati-
cally, the rule disregards the realities of the credit marketplace in which
partnership creditors, in reliance on the principle of liability in solido,
consider the creditworthiness of individual partners when extending
credit to the partnership. 7 3 Finally, because the lot of the partnership
creditor in a partner's proceeding is ordinarily such a poor one, the rule
has placed considerable weight on the issue of whether particular con-
duct of a partner gave rise to a partnership liability or only a personal
liability. That issue usually turns on a close parsing of all the facts and
circumstances, with delay and expense the inevitable by-products.174
The justifications for this priority have never persuasively an-
swered these criticisms. The adoption of this two hundred year old
common law rule in the federal bankruptcy act was explained as neces-
sary to maintain harmony with existing state law. 175 The most frequent
rationale for the priority has been that the rule is an integral compo-
nent of a set of dual priorities that provides a workable, if somewhat
crude, compromise between the interests of partnership and individual
creditors which does justice for both groups. 176 The priority also has
been defended on the grounds of its venerability and national accept-
ance, 177 and was in fact defended on those grounds by the Department
of Justice in hearings on the new Act.'78
None of these rationales was persuasive to the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference which, in 1962, recommended elimination of this
priority. 79 Congress did not enact that recommendation then, but has
done so in the new Act.
As under current law, the new Act provides that claims may be
172. See, e.g., Shroder, Distribution ofAssets of Bankrupt Partnersh#ps and Partners, 18
HARV. L. REV. 495 (1905) (criticizing rule and the common law from which it was derived).
173. CRaNE & BROMBERG, supra note 152, at 531-32; MacLachlan, supra note 8, at 255;
Note, Partnershifp Bankruptcy: Proposed Amendments to the National Bankruptcy Act, 48
IowA L. REv. 955, 959 (1963).
174. See, e.g., cases cited in IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.30-.32 (14th ed. 1978).
175. See generally Kennedy, supra note 8, at 630-32.
176. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 631. One critic retorts that this rationale reduces to a
sympathy for "superficial symmetry and lyrical euphony." MacLachlan, supra note 8, at
256.
177. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 152, § 91A at 533; Unaccomplished Reforms,
supra note 5, at 920. The universality of this priority in this country has been assured by the
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act, which embraces it. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 40(b).
178. Proposed Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H 32 Before
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights ofthe House Cmna on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2093 (1976) (statement of Richard A. Lavine, Department of Justice).
179. Horsky Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5.
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filed against a partner's estate by that partner's separate creditors, by
partnership creditors, 180 and by a partnership trustee.' 8l The priority
of such claimants in the partner's estate is addressed only in section
723(c) of the 1978 Act which provides:
Notwithstanding section 728(c) of this title, the trustee has a claim
against the estate of each general partner in such partnership that is a
debtor in a case under this title for the full amount of all claims of
creditors allowed in the case concerning such partnership. Notwith-
standing section 502 of this title, there shall not be allowed in such a
case a claim against such partner on which both such partner and
such partnership are liable, except to any extent that such claim is
secured only by property of such partner and not by property of such
partnership. The claim of the trustee under this subsection is entitled
to distribution in such case under section 726(a) of this title the same
as any other claim of the kind specified in such section.' 82
This measure is subject to criticism on two points. First, while it
clarifies that the claim of the partnership trustee no longer will be
subordinated to that of a separate creditor, it fails to address the priori-
ties between partnership and separate creditors in the absence of a
trustee claimant. The legislative history evidences an intent to elimi-
nate any subordination of the interests of partnership creditors regard-
less of how they are advanced. 83 While that subordination arguably is
inherent in the nature of partnership and applies as a matter of state
law, in the absence of federal rule to the contrary, courts should be
moved by the spirit of the 1978 Act to conclude that partnership and
partner creditors are to be treated alike in any partner proceeding.
The second criticism is that the confusing disallowance language
in the second sentence of the provision obscures the apparent legisla-
tive intent. Its literal import seems to disable the partnership trustee
from proceeding against a debtor partner to the extent that partnership
creditors individually have filed claims against the partner based on
liability in solido. This of course encourages, or at least tolerates, frag-
mented, multi-party proceedings. Quite to the contrary, however, the
legislative history of the provision reveals an intent that the creditors'
claims should be disallowed when an order for relief is entered in favor
of the partnership trustee on the section 723(c) claim. 184 The latter ap-
180. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 303; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 198.
181. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 723(c).
182. Id.
183. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 17, at
95.
184. The procedures to be followed in these circumstances remain uncertain, as the leg-
islative history states that as this trustee claim "is automatically entitled to distribution, it
need not be filed, nor allowed." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 17, at 200.
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proach is preferable.
This reform is another instance in which the 1978 Act will elimi-
nate collateral disputes and, if the critics of the jingle rule are to be
believed, will protect the expectations of partnership creditors although
at the expense of the separate creditors. Federal bankruptcy law will
now diverge from state law governing state insolvency and receivership
proceedings, at least until the state legislatures revise the widely en-
acted Uniform Partnership Act. 185 Whenever partnership creditors
have unsatisfied claims of the amount necessary to commence a federal
proceeding, they almost certainly will resort to the federal forum in the
years ahead.
Partners and Partnerships as Creditors
The treatment in bankruptcy of a purported debtor-creditor rela-
tionship between a partnership and one of its partners deserves special
attention. A partner may assume the mantle of a "true" creditor of the
partnership, claiming not on the basis of an ownership interest and
right to receive a pro rata share of net partnership assets, but on the
strength of an independent loan to the partnership. 186 Similarly, a
partnership may claim against one of its partners for repayment of a
loan, a claim distinct from a call for an additional capital contribution
in the face of excessive firm liabilities.
Under current law such claims have faired poorly. Although ordi-
narily allowed in the proceeding, the creditor claim of the partner
against the partnership is subordinated to the claims of partnership
creditors, 8 7 and the creditor claim of the partnership against its partner
is subordinated to the claim of that partner's separate creditors.188 By
and large the courts so holding are guided by the jingle rule of section
5(g), which is viewed as not only disabling the partner or his or her
trustee from partaking in the partnership estate on any basis until the
partnership creditors have been satisfied, but also disabling the partner-
185. Ironically, it was the federal bankruptcy law's embrace of the jingle rule which
persuaded the drafters of the Uniform Partnership Act to adopt it in the interest of harmony
between the federal and state systems. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 631-32.
186. The partner's "true" loan to the partnership is to be distinguished from his or her
right to return of the initial capital contribution, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 18, 40(b),
and from his or her interest in the partnership, which is the right to a pro rata share of the
profits. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26.
187. In re Hess, I F.2d 342 (W.D. Pa. 1923); In re Effinger, 184 F. 728 (D. Md. 1911); In
re Rice, 164 F. 509 (D. Pa. 1908).
188. In re Telfer, 184 F. 224 (6th Cir. 1910); In re Lane, 14 F. Cas. 1070 (C.D. Mass.
1874) (No. 8,004); Potts v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 A. 592 (1897).
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ship or its trustee from sharingparipassu with the separate creditors in
the estate of the partner. 18 9 To hold otherwise would effectively permit
the partner or the partnership to compete with its own creditors. 90
The fairness of these principles is subject to question when applied
in a case in which there is a legitimate claim between a partnership and
one of its partners arising from a transaction independent of the part-
nership relationship.19' The great benefit of these principles, however,
is that they obviate the need for close scrutiny of the nature of the par-
ticular arrangement or events giving rise to the claim. Partnership ac-
countings frequently are not kept with great rigor and are susceptible to
reinterpretation and even revision by the partners as financial distress
sets in.' 92 The identification of particular contributions to a partner-
ship as either equity or debt may be kept only in the mind of the man-
aging partner and may not make much difference to the outside
creditor who, perhaps naively, views all such funds as augmenting the
operating resources and creditworthiness of the partnership. 193
Under the 1978 Act, somewhat different results are likely to be
obtained. The elevation of partnership creditors to equality with sepa-
rate creditors in a partner estate dictates that the claim of a partnership
qua creditor can no longer be subordinated. This may require greater
scrutiny of such claims to ensure they are more than a call for an un-
paid capital contribution. With respect to the claims of a partner as
creditor, the priority of partnership creditors in partnership assets pre-
sumably will be continued. The 1978 Act does not contain a blanket
disability for partners such as that derived from present section 5(g),
however, and this omission may induce courts to reconsider the ques-
tion of whether and when a partner may have a claim against the part-
nership which deserves treatment equal to that of any outside creditor.
189. See, e.g., In re Telfer, 184 F. 224 (6th Cir. 1910); In re Effinger, 184 F. 728 (D. Md.
1911).
190. See In re Effinger, 184 F. 728 (D. Md. 1911).
191. Their unfairness is particularly poignant when the claim of a partnership is a tort
claim against a partner for wrongful conversion of partnership property; in such circum-
stances the partnership claimant has been permitted to stand on equal footing with the part-
ner's separate creditors. McElroy v. Allfree, 131 Iowa 518, 108 N.W. 119 (1906). See also
Ryan v. Cavanagh, 238 F. 604 (D. Iowa 1916).
192. See, e.g., In re Ervin, 109 F. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1901), afd sub nom. Wallerstein v.
Ervin, 112 F. 124 (3d Cir. 1901).
193. Wallerstein v. Ervin, 112 F. 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1901).
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Discharge
With certain exceptions noted below,194 under current law any
person adjudicated a bankrupt may obtain a discharge from those
debts properly scheduled in the proceeding. 95 Accordingly, a partner-
ship may be discharged from its debts by undergoing administration in
bankruptcy although ordinarily such a discharge is sought only when
there exists statutory or contractual authorization to continue the part-
nership's business and avoid completely winding up partnership af-
fairs. 196 Similarly, an adjudicated partner can obtain a discharge from
both individual debts, including, in some circumstances, liabilities to
other partners arising from partnership affairs197 and partnership
debts.'98 However, the discharge of a partner alone does not operate as
a discharge of the partnership or of other partners. 99 Generally, a
partnership may still be sued, either in its common name or in the
name of a nonbankrupt partner,200 for partnership debts for which a
general partner is no longer accountable.
Conversely, the discharge of a partnership has no effect on the lia-
bility of partners for partnership debts.20' This rule has been criticized
heavily on the ground that it treats unfairly the solvent partner whose
assets and liabilities are evaluated in determining partnership insol-
vency and who suffers most of the burdens of bankruptcy through the
administration of his or her estate by the partnership trustee.
202
The new Act prohibits granting a discharge to a partnership in an
attempt to prevent "trafficking. . .in bankrupt partnerships. ' 203 Al-
though the mangitude of this trafficking under current law remains
shrouded in the legislative process, one undeniable effect of this reform
194. See notes 196-98 & accompanying text infra.
195. Sections 14(a), 17(a)(3) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(a), 35(a)(3) (1976)).
196. See generally CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 152, § 83A, at 474-75. It has been
doubted that a partnership would ever seek a discharge. In re Forbes, 128 F. 137, 139 (D.
Mass. 1904).
197. D. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 725, at 467 (2d ed. 1978).
198. In addition to the generally applicable provisions, discharge of the partner debtor is
specifically authorized by § 5(j) (codified at I1 U.S.C. § 23(j) (1976)).
199. See Kimmel v. State, 75 Ind. App. 168, 128 N.E. 708 (1920).
200. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 152, § 96, at 560.
201. Section 5(j) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(j) (1976)). Prior to its codification in 1938 as
part of the Chandler Act, this rule had been developed by the courts as an implicit term of
the Act of 1898. See Unaccomplished Reforms, supra note 5, at 924.
202. See, e.g., Note, Bankruptcy--Partnerships-artnershifs in Bankruptcy, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 457, 466 (1953); Unaccomplished Reforms, supra note 5, at 924; Comment, Partnership
Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 105, 112 (1938).
203. S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 8, at 98; see 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 727(a)(1).
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is to make continued use of a particular partnership shell after adminis-
tration in bankruptcy undesirable, if it ever was otherwise. The contin-
ued relevance of the criticism that individual, solvent partners should
be discharged of partnership debts at the conclusion of a partnership
administration will remain unresolved until the courts determine the
extent of the power the partnership trustee has over nondebtor part-
ners.
Under existing law, a discharge is barred if the debtor has commit-
ted one of the wilful offenses or other forms of misconduct enumerated
in section 14(c). 20 4 Further, a discharge does not encompass certain
nondischargeable debts enumerated in section 17.205 In partnership
proceedings, these restrictions can raise the familiar and fiercely con-
tested question of whether a particular act or debt was that of the part-
nership or merely that of an individual partner. The general principle
that any action taken or debt made by a partner within the scope of
authority will be attributed to the partnership doubtless controls,206 but
this remains a factual question capable of provoking intense litigation
and requiring close scrutiny by the court. The elimination of the part-
nership discharge in the 1978 Act also eliminates this source of poten-
tial dispute and delay.
The section 14 bar to, and the section 17 exceptions from, dis-
charge also have posed difficulties in partner proceedings. A court will
conclude fairly quickly that a section 14 act by one partner within the
scope of authority will bar the discharge of both the partnership and
that of the individual. 20 7 Similarly, a section 17 debt incurred by a
partner for the partnership is not dischargeable in either the partner-
ship or the individual proceedings.20 8 An issue more often litigated,
and one given inconsistent treatment by the courts, is whether a part-
nership's section 14 offense of section 17 debt will be attributed to part-
ners other than the partner actually committing the offense or incurring
the debt for the partnership. 20 9 With respect to section 14, the issue has
proven particularly troublesome in those cases where one element of
204. Section 14(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1976)).
205. Section 17 (codified at II U.S.C. § 35 (1976)).
206. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13; see also Frank v. Michigan Paper Co., 179 F.
776 (4th Cir. 1910).
207. Charles Edward & Assoc. v. England, 301 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Bernstein,
197 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1952); In re Perri, [1968] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 63,188.
208. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. v. Campese, 14 A.D.2d 487, 217 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App.
Div. 1961).
209. One ordinarily does not attribute a partnership act of bankruptcy to all the partners
for purposes of that requirement. In re Jercyn Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the offense requires some measure of intent or wilfulness behind the
conduct, such as the destruction of financial records210 or the giving of
false financial statements.2 " In these cases the courts generally recog-
nize a presumption of knowledge by all partners of wrongful acts and
consequently impose a burden on the partner asking for discharge to
show actual innocence. 212
Section 17 excepts from discharge certain debts arising from mis-
conduct, such as a debt for moneys obtained by false financial state-
ments and liability for wilful or malicious injury to or conversion of
property, raising the same issue of attribution. Here, however, every
partner is held responsible for the misconduct giving rise to that debt,
and the debt is held nondischargeable as to every partner.213 The dif-
ference in treatment from that seen under section 14 is rationalized on
the ground that while section 14 concerns the right of discharge, section
17 only concerns the effect of a discharge.214 The difference is perhaps
better explained as the reflection of a suitable compromise whereby
partners not actually involved in the misconduct are spared the dispro-
portionate punishment of denial of discharge, yet are denied any unjust
enrichment that might flow from such misconduct at the expense of the
injured creditor.
The new Act largely carries over the substance of sections 14215
and 17,216 and those refinements Congress has made, with one excep-
tion,217 are not especially germane to partnership and partner bank-
ruptcy. The vague principles governing attribution of partnership
misconduct to ostensibly innocent partners for discharge purposes will
210. See 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 14(c)(2).
211. See i. § 14(c)(3).
212. Morimura, Arai & Co. v. Taback, 279 U.S. 24 (1929); In re Herzog, 121 F.2d 581
(2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied sub nom. Herzog v. Dorman, 315 U.S. 807 (1942); cf. In re
Schacter, 170 F. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1907) (fraudulent act of one partner injures only that part-
ner's rights to discharge).
213. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); Frank v. Michigan Paper Co., 179 F.
776 (4th Cir. 1910); In re Hankins, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 409 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
214. See, e.g., In re Lubbers, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1293 (W.D. Mich. 1975); In re Margulies,
I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 388 (D.D.C. 1973).
215. 1978 Act, supra note 1, § 727(a).
216. Id. § 523.
217. It does add a new bar to discharge of potential significance on partnership proceed-
ings: a discharge will be denied if the debtor commits any of the other enumerated offenses
"in connection with another case concerning an insider." 1978 Act, supra note 1,
§ 727(a)(7). Since a partnership is an insider of a general partner, any misconduct by a
general partner with respect to the partnership's assets and financial records is now explicit
grounds for a later bar to individual discharge. Id. § 101(25)(A)(ii).
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require further explanation by the courts before any generalizations
can be made.
Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 achieves a largely unher-
alded reform of the administration of partnership bankruptcy. It elimi-
nates most of the special rules for such proceedings and several general
provisions whose application has proven particularly troublesome in
the partnership setting. Most significantly, the Act revises the much-
criticized distribution rule of dual priorities. Congress has left certain
questions unanswered, however, particularly concerning the selection
and powers of a partnership trustee. Until such matters are resolved by
further legislation, judicial decision, or rule, the partnership bank-
ruptcy process will continue to be subject to criticism and dispute.
